Humanity as Second Idea in Ethics’ System
From bib. source
From nature I come to the work of man[sic].
What is meant here by “second Idea” is that it proceeds from the first Idea, “Idea” possibly referring to some kind of intrinsic relation between actions and thought whereby that relation constitutes or can be described by a practical postulate (hence why Hegel sees ethics as a complete system of Ideas). Insofar as future metaphysics is ethics understood as the formulation of practical postulates, Hegel seems to be suggesting an ontology consisting of a transcendental condition of action wherein such conditions should be characterized as mental. Hence why Hegel calls them Ideas.
As this second Idea, of humanity, proceeds from the first, it does so following the question of physics, according to Hegel: What must the world be like for our absolutely free moral agent possessed of self-consciousness? Physics, qua a study of nature, allows one to “come to the work of man[sic]” (Hegel 1998, 28). It is ambiguous whether Hegel here means the products or effects of mankind’s activity, or if he means mankind itself. In either case, Hegel wants to demonstrate that either humanity, or human activity’s products/effects, should not on its/their own lead us to derive the State as an Idea, i.e. it/they should not lead us to derive the State as a transcendental condition of action or a practical postulate of thought determinate upon action (Ibid):
From bib. source
The Idea of mankind [being] premised — I shall prove that it gives us no Idea of the State[sic], since the State is a mechanical thing, any more than it gives us an Idea of a machine[sic]. Only something that is an objective [Gegenstand[sic]] of freedom[sic] is called an Idea. So we must go even beyond the State! — for every State must treat free men as cogs in a machine; and this it ought not to do; so it must stop[sic].
Further, Hegel attributes this lack of ability to derive the Idea of the State from the Idea of humanity to the contrast between the State being merely mechanical and “something that is an objective […] of freedom,” asserting that it is only the latter which can be called an Idea.
Why does Hegel think that Ideas must have freedom as objective?
While I have no clue why this would be, one may suspect it has something to do with the determination of the essence of the self by the absolutely free consciousness (i.e., something to do with the self-determinant free consciousness) discussed in the first Idea. It may be that nothing which is to be derived from the first Idea can deviate from the self-determination held in it. Or, rather, that it can or may but only so long as it returns to or serves that very self-determination. If the State is excluded from this path of derivations, then it could be seen as simply a contingent part of the “world” that arose together with the self of consciousness. This would also explain why Hegel here states that it is necessary to go beyond the State as it treats “free men as cogs in a machine” and this “it ought not to do” (Ibid). It is a bit confusing here why and in what sense the State would need to stop treating men this way, as presumably their freedom is already assured by the first Idea as that freedom is essential or substantial.
From bib. source
It is self-evident that in this sphere all the Ideas, of perpetual peace etc., are only subordinate[sic] Ideas under a higher one. At the same time I shall here lay down the principles for a history of mankind, and strip the whole wretched human work of State, constitution, government, legal system — naked to the skin.
It is herein ambiguous what “this” is calling back to in “in this sphere,” and thus in what sphere he asserts that Ideas are subordinate under a higher one (i.e., under, presumably, a higher Idea).
P. 28 / 40, continue interpreting
Self-explanatory.
organicism mechanism Hegelianism Georg_Hegel Georg_FW_Hegel Georg_Friedrich_Wilhelm_Hegel philosophy philosophy_of_action idealism absolute_idealism Hegelianism practical_postulate practical_postulates essence quiddity transcendentalism transcendental_idealism
bibliography
- Houlgate, Stephen, ed. “Early Writings.” In The Hegel Reader, 23–44. Blackwell Readers. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 1998.