Moral Agency as First Idea in Ethics’ System
From “Early Writings¨ in The Hegel Reader
The first Idea is, of course, the presentation [Vorstellung][sic] of my[sic] self as an absolutely free entity [Wesen]. Along with the free, self-conscious essence there stands forth–out of nothing–an entire world[sic]–the one true and thinkable creation out of nothing.–Here I shall descend into the realm of physics; the question is this: how must a world be constituted for a moral entity?
Due to the intrinsic relation between Ideas and action such that metaphysics falls under the scope of ethics’ practical postulates, Hegel posits that the first Idea is then the “presentation,¨ the “becoming-present¨ or apparition, of the self as an absolutely free entity–that is, an entity which is universally capable of everything. This entity is also characterized by Hegel as a “self-conscious essence¨ (Hegel 1998, 28). Insofar as an essence is the property / attribute or set of properties / attributes that make an entity what it is, or without which the entity would lose its identity, Hegel is in such a case saying that the quiddity of the absolutely free entity (i.e., thing such that it exists) is “self-conscious.¨ This could mean either that:
- The entity itself, in its being absolutely free, only can have essence insofar as such essence is determined by self-consciousness, thereby contingent on the state of that self-consciousness
- The essence of the given entity is its very self-consciousness
It is important to remember that the entity discussed here is the self–it is the self in its absolute freedom for whom the aforementioned two mutually exclusive claims would apply.
Relationship between self, consciousness, and self-consciousness
If the first option is the one that were to apply, does consciousness then precede self-consciousness? And does consciousness then determine an essence for the self such that its own internal state is altered?
Hegel also makes another claim in this quote, namely that “along with¨ this self arises a world. “Along with¨ one can interpret to mean simultaneous with in some sense. Hegel describes the arising of the world in simultaneity with the self as occurring ex nihilo, and even uses the word “creation,¨ suggesting that there is agency or intention behind the existence of the world. It is not clear that Hegel extends this also to the self–it is likely he does not, insofar as the self is an essence determined by the absolutely free consciousness in the first place.
Determination of self by consciousness and the arising of world
What is the relationship between how consciousness may determine the quiddity or essence of the self and this simultaneous arising of the world?
Finally, Hegel leaves us with a question (Ibid):
From “Early Writings¨ in The Hegel Reader
[…] how must a world be constituted for a moral entity?
Which Hegel treats as a question that falls within the domain of physics, whatever “physics¨ may mean for him given his idealism and the potential anachronism of the word. In asking the question, Hegel already reveals some more things about his position–that the self is moral besides also being an agent. Another way of phrasing the question Hegel asks is: what must the world be like for our absolutely free moral agent possessed of self-consciousness, given our absolutely free moral agent possessed of self-consciousness was simply already postulated? That is, what properties the world can have must be constrained by its allowance of such an entity.
Conflation between unboundedness and free will
Could Hegel be conflating the unbound or un-scoped / or globally scoped nature of the self with the idea that the self possesses free will?
Reasons for the first Idea or practical postulate
Why would an / the absolutely free moral agent possessed of self-consciousness be our first Idea or our first practical postulate (to the extent these are the same)?
libertarianism free_will moral_agency Hegelianism Georg_Hegel Georg_FW_Hegel Georg_Friedrich_Wilhelm_Hegel determinism ex_nihilo creation_ex_nihilo
bibliography
- Houlgate, Stephen, ed. “Early Writings.” In The Hegel Reader, 23–44. Blackwell Readers. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 1998.