Argument Blunders v. Argument Fallacies
From “Argument as Reasoned Dialogue¨ in Informal Logic
Some violations of negative rules of dialogue are better classified as blunders[sic] rather than fallacies because […] they are simply errors or lapses that damage or weaken the case of their proponent rather than defeating his opponent in the dialogue. Other arguments are incomplete because they do not respond adequately to the critical questions of the participant they were designed to persuade. Such arguments are not “fallacies.” They are better classified as weak or incomplete instances of argumentation.
According to this, a preliminary definition of a blunder consists in errors or lapses in argumentation by a proponent that damage or weaken a proponent’s own case in a persuasion dialogue or critical discussion (refer to 20241031110100-Types_of_Critical_Discussions & Critical Discussion). In other words, a blunder can be understood as an argumentative self-sabotage (Walton 2008, 15). In some cases, the self-sabotaging nature of the argumentation is due to its incompleteness or its inadequacy in response to critical questions (Ibid). What a fallacy, by contrast, is, is not explicitly defined herein beyond it being:
From “Argument as Reasoned Dialogue¨ in Informal Logic
[…] systematically deceptive strategies of argumentation based on an underlying, systematic error of reasoned dialogue.
The notion of a fallacy can be traced back to an Aristotelian concept called the “sophistical refutation¨ (Walton 2008, 16):
From “Argument as Reasoned Dialogue¨ in Informal Logic
A sophistical refutation of an argument is a refutation that plausibly appears to be a successful refutation, but is not. The term ‘sophistical´ refers to a certain trickery or illusion that conceals a logical incorrectness.
Plausibility and fallacious quality of argumentation
Perhaps this connection to the sophistical refutation suggests some kind of relationship between the plausibility of an argument (refer to 20241102155355-Plausibility_in_Argumentation) and its fallacious argumentation.
Appearance of fallacious quality should not provoke dismissal
It should be noted that this connection leads to the “misconception that all kinds of arguments coming under the traditional categories of ’fallacies´ are inherently bad or worthless, and that all such arguments should, by the standards of logic, be thoroughly refuted in every instance¨ (Ibid). To the contrary, “[r)ecent research¨ indicates “that many of the fallacies are instances of reasonable forms of argument, and therefore such forms of argument cannot be automatically dismissed without examining each case in detail¨ (Ibid).
To evaluate an argument as fallacious, one needs to consider it (Ibid):
From “Argument as Reasoned Dialogue¨ in Informal Logic
[…] in relation not only to the form of the argument, but also in relation to the context of dialogue in which it is embedded.
Commitment store and fallacious quality of argumentation
The evaluation of an argument then would seem to have to be connected to the concept of the commitment-store, as the commitment-store is affected by the ongoing persuasion dialogue or critical discussion as a whole (refer to 20241031115110-The_Commitment_Store).
What is clear is that argumentative dialogue blunders, i.e. argumentative self-sabotage, and fallacious argumentation both are likelier to result from violations of negative rules of dialogue. The different kinds of rules operative in dialogue were covered in 20241030172002-Stages_of_Argumentative_Dialogue. What makes a persuasion dialogue or critical discussion rule negative as opposed to positive is that, while (Walton 2008, 15):
From “Argument as Reasoned Dialogue¨ in Informal Logic
[…] positive rules of persuasion dialogue provide a normative model[sic] of good persuasion dialogue, a kind of ideal of dialogue against which particular cases of argumentation can be judged.
Negative rules, on the other hand (Ibid):
From “Argument as Reasoned Dialogue¨ in Informal Logic
[…] state prohibitions
That, when violated (Ibid):
From “Argument as Reasoned Dialogue¨ in Informal Logic
[…] can result in errors, faults, and shortcomings, of various kinds, in argumentation.
logic informal_logic argumentation_theory logical_pragmatics negative_rules positive_rules sophistical_refutation informal_fallacy plausible_argument informal_fallacies sophistical_refutations negative_rule positive_rule plausible_arguments argumentative_dialogue
bibliography
- “Argument as Reasoned Dialogue.” In Informal Logic: A Pragmatic Approach, 2nd ed., 2–37. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.